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Income-tax Department
Edited by Stephen G. Rusk

Perhaps the most difficult thing for a taxpayer to comprehend is how the
government can be justified in imposing a tax of penalty on a condition which
is non-existent at the time when the taxpayer is required to make a return but
comes into being subsequent thereto.
A case which illustrates is that of the Hartford-Connecticut Trust Company,
trustee, v. the collector. It appears from a reading of this case that at the time
for making the federal income-tax return, the company was advised that the
profits from certain sales were not subject to the income tax, as a court decision
in Brewster v. Walsh had so held in the case of similar sales. The taxpayer in
view of that decision made no tax return. Subsequently the decision in the
Brewster v. Walsh case was reversed by a higher court. The taxpayer being
unaware of this later decision made no return, and as a result faced the pre
scribed penalty for failure to do so, and the question finally came before the
United States district court, district of Connecticut which held that:
“A decision of the district court, holding that profits from certain
sales were not taxable, constituted reasonable cause of failure to file at the
time due, a return reporting such profits from similar sales but the reversal
of the district court decision by the supreme court of the United States rendered
such cause for not filing of no effect after the date of the reversal.”
In other words, the taxpayer was freed from the penalty for failure to make a
return at date when such return was due, but was repenalized because he did
not make a return on the date when the supreme court’s reversal of the district
court decision took effect. From the foregoing it would appear that it is
required of a taxpayer to keep abreast of all the various court’s decisions and,
picking out the latest decision, steer his course accordingly. It does not appear
to matter that courts frequently change a given decision more than once.
Believing the term “unjust” is a bit too descriptive we venture the opinion
that the taxpayer would be warranted in terming the decision a trifle extraor
dinary.
Another instance of the exasperating development by reason of the govern
ment’s assertion of the post view of certain transactions, we cite the case of a
taxpayer who received as a gift certain stock of a corporation in 1918 which
at the time of receiving it was worth $100.00 a share when judged by all the
available data and history. Some years later the taxpayer sold the stock for
$20.00 a share, the subsequent financial history of the company showing losses.
By all available known reasons the taxpayer considered that no profit had been
earned or received by him in selling for $20.00 that which at date of its receipt
was reasonably worth $100.00, and he made no return.
Subsequently, the commissioner determined, largely from the viewpoint
of subsequent history, that the stock was worth only a few dollars a share at
date of its acquisition and that the difference between that sum and the $20.00
a share was profit and that the taxpayer was required to pay the tax on the
alleged profit as well as the statutory penalty for failure to make return at
the time when it was due.
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It is such slavish adherence to the letter of the law, regardless of reason or
common sense, that causes so many to look hopefully for the time to come when
laws will be made more intelligible and when their interpretation by the
judiciary will be more courageous, and will cut through any jumble of am
biguities to the reasonable intent of the statutes.

SUMMARY OF RECENT RULINGS
Held, that the provision of sec. 245 (a) (2) act of 1921, which undertook to
abate the four per cent. deduction for the mean of the reserve fund of a life
insurance company required by law and held at the beginning and end of the
year, by the amount of interest received from tax free securities cannot be
given effect as against the taxpayer. (United States supreme court, National
Insurance Company v. United States.)
Mandamus will not issue to compel the board of tax appeals to enter as its
decision the decision of the division which heard an appeal and which the board
reversed upon review after the expiration of the thirty day period when the
decision of the division is by statute made final, the taxpayer having an ade
quate remedy in law. (Court of appeals of District of Columbia, Board of tax
appeals v. United States ex rel. James S. McCandless.)
In a suit against the taxpayer and the surety on a bond given pursuant to
sec. 234 (a) (14) (a), act of 1918, in connection with a claim for abatement of
part of 1918 taxes, the cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations
five years after the return was filed where the parties had agreed to pay “any
part of such tax found by the commissioner to be due” and the obligation to
pay such tax was extinguished under sec. 1106 (a), act of 1926, prior to the
commencement of the action.
The filing of a bond, in and of itself, in connection with a claim for abatement
of 1918 taxes is not a waiver of the limitation provision of the statute, the
express provision in sec. 250 (d), act of 1921, for written consents to a later
determination, etc., of the tax excluding the possibility of implied waivers.
(United States circuit court of appeals, seventh circuit, United States v. the John
Barth Company and United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company.)
The government has six years for collection of 1920 taxes assessed in 1926
within the limitation period on assessment provided under the 1924 act as
extended by a waiver signed after the passage of the 1924 act. (United States
district court, W. D., Louisiana, Shreveport division, Mrs. Alma Foster Atkins v.
J. O. Bender, collector.)
Suit for refund of taxes for a year involved in a proceeding before the board
of tax appeals is not prohibited where the proceeding before the board was
heard after the passage of the 1926 act but such proceeding was filed with the
board prior to such date. (United States district court, W. D., Pennsylvania,
Earle C. and Lewis Emery, executors v. United States.)
Loss sustained on the closing out in 1920 of a December “future” intended as
a “hedge” against a sale of “cash” oats for December or later delivery, which
were delivered in 1921, is deductible only in 1920 by a cash grain dealer on the
cash receipts and disbursements basis, the “future” sales and the “hedging”
contract closed out in different years constituting separate transactions.
(United States district court, N. D., Illinois, Edwin R. Bacon Grain Company
v. Mabel G. Reinecke, collector.)
A pro rata portion of premiums received by a corporation not later than 1904
on bonds issued at a premium, apportioned to the year 1920, may not be taxed
as income of the corporation in 1920. (United States circuit court of appeals,
first circuit, Commissioner v. Old Colony Railway.)
Written instruments conveying standing and growing timber on land owned
by the transferers situated in the states of Washington and Idaho providing
for the actual severence and removal of such timber from the land within a
reasonable time, were held to be subject to the stamp tax imposed by the 1918,
1921 and 1924, acts upon conveyances of realty the decided weight of authority
in both states holding that such timber is realty. (United States district
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court, W. D., Washington, S. D., Milwaukee Land Company v. Burns Poe,
collector.)
The value of the interest of the widow created by Nebraska statute in lieu
of dower, in the estate of her husband dying intestate in Nebraska should be
included in the decedent’s gross estate under the act of 1921, such property
passing to the widow as a distributee. (United States court of claims, Nels S.
Nyberg, administrator, v. United States.)
The inheritance tax paid by the administrators of a decedent dying on
February 19, 1918, in Massachusetts is a charge against the estate within the
meaning of sec. 203 (a) (1) act of 1916, and is deductible from the value of the
gross estate. (United States court of claims, Sherburn M. Merrill, et al., ad
ministrators, v. United States.)
Amounts spent in 1914, 1915 and 1916, inclusive, in advertising in order
to secure valuable contracts constitute capital expenditures which should be
spread over a period of years, the fact that the taxpayer had erroneously
charged such expenditures to current expense and had deducted them as such
in its returns for the years in which the amounts were expended not preventing
a correction of its books and its returns so as to treat them as capital expendi
tures for income and profits tax purposes. (United States court of claims,
United Profit Sharing Corporation v. United States.)
Income from a testamentary trust created by a decedent for his grand
children distributed to such grandchildren during the years involved for their
support, maintenance and education, was held to be distributed “periodically,
whether or not at regular intervals” within the meaning of sec. 219 (a) (4),
acts of 1918 and 1921, and, as such, taxable to the beneficiaries, where the
decedent directed that the property should be held in trust for his grandchil
dren until they reach the age of 25 and the trustees should “pay over to them
such part of the income and interest thereof as in her discretion shall seem best.”
(United States circuit court of appeals, first circuit, Commissioner v. Mary L.
Barton, trustee.)
Income received in 1919 to 1923, inclusive, by a widow in lieu of her statutory
share of the corpus of her husband’s estate is not taxable income to her where
her husband’s will provided that the residue of his estate be placed in trust and
the net income be paid to her for and during her life “in lieu of dower and all
claims she might or could have by any possibility upon the estate,” and the
annual payments did not exceed the value of the property she relinquished by
accepting the provisions of the will, such payments, under the laws of the state
having jurisdiction (Massachusetts) representing “purchase money” or “in
stalment payments” by the estate in consideration for her share in the corpus
of the estate. (United States circuit court of appeals, first circuit, United
States v. Wilfred Bolster, executor.)
A dividend declared in January, 1917, from 1916 earnings, payable in six
instalments, there being in fact no undistributed 1916 earnings at the time,
does not come within the proviso of sec. 31 (b), act of 1916, as modified by
sec. 1211, act of 1917, exempting distributions made prior to August 6, 1917,
out of earnings or profits accruing prior to March 1, 1913.
Dividends declared in 1917 from 1916 earnings, there being in fact no un
distributed net earnings at the time, must be considered as payable from 1917
earnings to the extent of 1917 earnings prorated to date of payment, such prof
its to be determined without considering available for distribution in 1917,
the amount of refund of 1917 taxes made in 1922. (United States district court,
N. D., Georgia, Atlanta division, Samuel C. Dobbs v. J. T. Rose, collector.)
A net loss sustained in the period beginning February 1, 1919, and ending
December 31, 1919, such eleven-month period resulting from a voluntary
change in accounting period approved by the commissioner, may be applied
against the net income of the preceding taxable year, such period of less than
twelve months being a “taxable year” within the meaning of sec. 204 (b) act
of 1918. (United States district court, W. D., Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania
Chocolate Company v. C. C. Llewellyn, former collector.)
The claim of the United States for taxes against a corporation in an equi
table receivership is not entitled to priority over the claims of the general
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creditors, where all the assets of the corporation did not pass to the equity
receivers as a trust fund for equal distribution to creditors, the situation not
being equivalent to a general assignment within the meaning of sec. 3466,
revised statutes. (United States district court, S. D., New York, Manhattan
Rubber Manufacturing Company v. Lucey Manufacturing Corporation.)
A decision of the district court, holding that profit from certain sales were
not taxable, constituted reasonable cause for failure to file at the time due a
return reporting such profits from similar sales, but the reversal of the district
court decision by the supreme court of the United States rendered such cause
for not filing of no effect after the date of the reversal. (United States district
court, Connecticut, Hartford-Connecticut Trust Company, trustee v. Robert O.
Eaton, collector.)
A corporation held to be entitled to personal service classification in 1918
where the bulk of its activities in such year consisted of maintenance and con
struction work for a railroad company under a contract by which the railroad
retained complete domination over the work to be done and of the force which
was to do it, supplied tools, materials, etc., paid all wages, the function of the
taxpayer being that of an engineer, organizer and superintendent, the income
from such activities being ascribable primarily to the principal owners or
stockholders and income from straight contract work, rents and investments
not being sufficient to bar the taxpayer from personal service classification.
(United States circuit court of appeals, seventh circuit, North American Rail
way Construction Company v. Commissioner.)
A taxpayer who transferred in 1919 his business and all the assets employed
therein to a corporation organized to take over such business and assets, and
which assumed all the business liabilities, in exchange for its capital stock in
an amount equal to the excess of the book value of the assets, which were
carried on the books at cost, over the liabilities of the business, the market
value of the assets at date of sale being less than the liabilities, may not deduct
the par value of such stock, which the court held had no market value, as a
loss (a) under sec. 214 (a), act of 1918, the stock of the corporation which
continued in business until 1921 not having been ascertained to be worthless in
that year, nor (b) under sec. 202 (b) since no taxable gain nor deductible loss
is recognized where the property received in exchange has no market value.
(United States district court, district of Massachusetts, Constantine V. Tsivoglou
v. United States.)
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